Tag: Damages

Damages Book Wins ACLEA Award

Posted on | by Linda Kruschke | 1 Comment on Damages Book Wins ACLEA Award

OSB Legal Publications has once again been recognized for our commitment to publishing quality legal resources. We received an award for a book we released in 2016.

The Association for Continuing Legal Education (ACLEA) has selected Damages as the winner of its ACLEA’s Best Award of Outstanding Achievement in Publications. A plaque commemorating the award was presented at ACLEA’s Annual Meeting in Montreal, Quebec, Canada in August and is on display in the lobby of the OSB Center.

Of course, Legal Pubs couldn’t have created this highly informative and innovative book without the help of our three volunteer editorial board members Hon. Karsten Rasmussen, Rick Lee, and Heather Bowman.

Damages was designed to support Oregon attorneys in their role as litigator and advisor. Whether the attorney is a recent law grad or a seasoned attorney, there is something in here for them. This publication was made possible only through the extra­ordinary dedication and gratuitous contribution of time and talent offered by 50 Oregon attorneys. The accomplished attorneys who drafted each chapter offered their insights—starting with an over­view of the particular practice area or basis for money damages, and drilling down into the most relevant details that practicing attorneys are likely to encounter in their practice. The authors included practice tips and caveats where appropriate. Many authors also provided references to other resources, which are often helpful springboards when greater depth of understanding in a nuanced area of the law is necessary.

The authors who volunteered their time and talent on this publication and made an ACLEA award possible are Allen E. Eraut, Julie A. Smith, Joshua Sasaki, Megan McGuire, Laura C. Johnson, David Auxier, Ted Reuter, Bernard S. Moore, Samuel T. Smith, Joshua D. Stadtler, Jeffrey D. Munns, Nicholas E. Wheeler, James C. Edmonds, Jeffrey A. Trautman, Donald E. Templeton, Frederick H. Lundblade, III, Jennifer Middleton, Meredith Holley, Hon. Benjamin M. Bloom, Thomas M. Triplett, Keith S. Dubanevich, Nadine A. Gartner, W. Greg Lockwood, Carson D. Bowler, Michelle G. Rudd, Reilley D. Keating, Jay W. Beattie, Gavin W. Bruce, Emily S. Miller, D. Gary Christensen, Cody Berne, Robert Lane Carey, Lindsay L. Reynolds, Sarah M. Einowski, Jeff Bradford, Rima I. Ghandour, Erin E. Gould, Bryan P. Murphy, Justine Fischer, Thomas C. Peachey, Andrew J. Myers, Michael B. Hallinan, Sara Kobak, Jordan R. Silk, James Coon, Gordon T. Carey, Jr.

The editorial review board, authors, and in-house editors have produced a deskbook that is practical, comprehensive, and well-supported with citations to legal authorities. It filled an ever-present need for up-to-date information on the law of damages in a variety of areas of law. Because of the quality of the publication and its unique place in the market it has become an invaluable resource for Oregon lawyers.

Damages (2016 Revision): Later, but Better

Posted on | by Linda Kruschke

by Dean Land, Legal Publications Attorney Editor

During our editing process here in the OSB Legal Publications Department, it’s not uncommon for the Oregon appellate courts to issue an opinion that affects the book that we’re working on. Sometimes, the effect is limited to a minor issue in one or two chapters. Other times, the effect is much broader (like when State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160 (2009), came down just as we were finishing Interpreting Oregon Law). Although it may delay publication, we’d much rather have such a case come down during the editing process than after we go to print. That way, instead of having a book that is immediately outdated, we can make the required edits and provide the Bar an up-to-date legal resource.

As we approach our deadline for the 2016 edition of Damages, the Oregon Supreme Court has indulged us once again, this time by issuing its opinion in Horton v. OHSU, 359 Or 168 (May 5, 2016). In a lengthy decision (140 pages in the Advance Sheets, including concurring and dissenting opinions), the court altered its interpretation of two provisions of the Oregon Constitution and, in doing so, overruled two significant prior decisions.

Before Horton, the court’s analysis of the Remedy Clause of Article I, section 10, was governed by Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or 83 (2001). Under Smothers, the court asked whether Oregon common law, as it stood in 1857 (when the Oregon Constitution was drafted), recognized a cause of action for the plaintiff’s alleged injury. If so, then the Remedy Clause required a constitutionally adequate remedy for that injury. Horton overruled Smothers and disavowed the bright-line rule that protected common-law causes of action that existed in 1857 but offered no protection for causes of action that did not exist in 1857. In place of the Smothers methodology, the court created a framework that considers “the extent to which the legislature [in altering a common-law remedy] has departed from the common-law model measured against its reasons for doing so.” Horton, 359 Or at 220.

Horton also changed the analysis of Article I, section 17, which protects the right to a jury trial in civil cases. Under Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., 329 Or 62, modified, 329 Or 369 (1999), if Oregon common law in 1857 recognized a cause of action, then Article I, section 17, prevented the trial court from reducing a jury verdict. Thus statutory caps on damages, such as those of the Oregon Tort Claims Act, were inapplicable to those causes of action. Horton overruled Lakin, deciding instead that Article I, section 17, guarantees only a procedural right to a jury for causes of action recognized by Oregon common law in 1857. It does not impose any substantive limits on the legislature’s authority to limit damages for a claim.

Horton affected seven chapters in Damages and required a bit of scrambling on our part. Our in-house editors read the opinion, revised the affected chapters, and sent them back to the authors and the editorial review board for approval and any additional changes. (One exasperated author commented that Horton came down just as he was beginning to understand Smothers.) In the end, though, the new edition of Damages will be more helpful to practitioners because it includes the changes wrought by Horton. Thanks to all our authors and the editorial review board for the extra effort!

Pain and Suffering Damages

Posted on | by Linda Kruschke

This article is an excerpt from Chapter 4 of Damages, by Lara Christine Johnson

For more information on this topic, check out the Damages book on BarBooks™. The print version of this book will be available later this year.

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  • 4.3    PROOF OF PAIN AND SUFFERING AS AN ELEMENT OF NONECONOMIC DAMAGES
  • 4.3-1 General Principles

To prove pain and suffering, the most significant general principle is that evidence must be presented showing that the plaintiff’s pain and suffering is causally related to the defendant’s conduct. See Crawford v. Seufert, 236 Or 369, 388 P2d 456 (1964). Sometimes that proof must be in the form of medical testimony; but sometimes the nature of the injury is such that laypersons or the jury can determine causation without the help of an expert.

In Ouma v. Skipton, 267 Or App 406, 341 P3d 124 (2014), the trial court struck the testimony of a chiropractor because he failed to testify that the injuries he treated were, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, caused by the collision. The trial court granted a motion for directed verdict on noneconomic damages on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence of causation. On appeal, the court noted that the record contained testimony by the plaintiff that he had fractured his tooth in the collision, evidence from which the jury could find causation without expert medical testimony. “Although we agree,” the court explained,

with the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiff necessarily would have to introduce expert medical testimony in order to establish causation with respect to the other injuries alleged in the complaint, we previously have held that defendant is not entitled to a directed verdict on an entire claim where there is sufficient evidence to permit a finding that the defendant’s conduct caused some part of the injuries alleged.

Ouma, 267 Or App at 409 (citing Wheeler v. LaViolette, 129 Or App 57, 61, 877 P2d 665 (1994)).

The severity of a plaintiff’s injuries will bear on the amount of proof required for noneconomic damages; “no severe physical injury can occur without involving mental distress.” Rostad v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., 101 Or 569, 582, 201 P 184 (1921); see also Smitson v. S. Pac. Co., 37 Or 74, 95, 60 P 907 (1900) (holding that damages for future pain and suffering of double amputee was not an erroneous jury instruction). Evidence of continued pain 18 months after an accident “establishes a probability that for sometime in the future plaintiff will suffer pain.” Odrlin v. Dugan, 137 Or 140, 142, 1 P2d 599 (1931); accord Nelson v. Tworoger, 256 Or 189, 192, 472 P2d 802 (1970).

If the plaintiff is seeking damages for permanent injuries, the existence of a scar two years after an accident is sufficient evidence of permanency. Kelley v. Light, 275 Or 241, 243, 550 P2d 427 (1976); Senkirik v. Royce, 192 Or 583, 593–94, 235 P2d 886 (1951).

  • 4.3-2 Proof from Medical Practitioners

Although expert medical testimony may not be required to prove future pain and suffering, it is a common practice that can be effective. See Hecker v. Union Cab Co., 134 Or 385, 392, 293 P 726 (1930); Kelley v. Light, 275 Or 241, 550 P2d 427 (1976). As a matter of trial tactics, the plaintiff’s counsel will likely present medical testimony to explain the future course of the injury and how it will affect the plaintiff’s life.

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  • 4.3-3 Other Types of Proof

The plaintiff’s testimony about his or her own condition is always competent evidence on the issue of past and future pain and suffering. Skeeters v. Skeeters, 237 Or 204, 231, 389 P2d 313, reh’g den, 237 Or 242, 391 P2d 386 (1964) (plaintiff’s testimony held sufficient evidence of his paralysis to go to the jury on the question of whether such paralysis actually existed); Frangos v. Edmunds, 179 Or 577, 589, 173 P2d 596 (1946). Nonmedical witnesses may testify about the plaintiff’s declarations of present pain or suffering or about the witness’s own observation of the plaintiff’s behavior while in pain, such as limited activity. Frangos, 179 Or at 593 (testimony of plaintiff’s wife); Weygandt v. Bartle, 88 Or 310, 319, 171 P 587 (1918). In Fieux v. Cardiovascular & Thoracic Clinic, P.C., 159 Or App 637, 978 P2d 429, rev den, 329 Or 318 (1999), the court held that a patient was not required to present expert testimony on the issue of negligence or emotional distress when a surgeon allegedly left a clamp behind during open heart surgery, thus requiring another surgery. “[I]njured plaintiffs are entitled to claim damages for mental anguish, which plaintiffs may establish through their own or other lay testimony.” Fieux, 159 Or App at 641 (emphasis omitted).

In addition to testimony from the plaintiff and other lay witnesses, day-in-the-life videos may be helpful to communicate the effects of an injury on the plaintiff. See Arnold v. Burlington N. R. Co., 89 Or App 245, 248, 748 P2d 174, rev den, 305 Or 576 (1988) (over defendant’s objections, videotape admitted into evidence because it “communicated to the jury effectively, and perhaps better than words could do, what plaintiff’s life as a double amputee was like”).

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